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Abstract
Counterfactual thoughts center on how the past could have been different. Such thoughts
may be differentiated in terms of direction of comparison, such that upward counterfactuals
focus on how the past could have been better, whereas downward counterfactuals focus on
how the past could have been worse. A key question is how such past-oriented thoughts
connect to future-oriented individual differences such as optimism. Ambiguities surround a
series of past studies in which optimism predicted relatively greater downward counterfac-
tual thinking. Our main study (N = 1150) and six supplementary studies (N = 1901) re-exam-
ined this link to reveal a different result, a weak relation between optimism and upward
(rather than downward) counterfactual thinking. These results offer an important correction
to the counterfactual literature and are informative for theory on individual differences in
optimism.
Introduction
Goal of the present research
Looking back on one’s past to compare what actually transpired to what might have been, (i.e.,
counterfactual thinking) is a common feature of mental experience [1–3]. Further, counterfac-
tual thoughts may be differentiated in terms of their direction of comparison, where upward
counterfactuals center on how an outcome could have been better than actuality and down-
ward counterfactuals center on how an outcome could have been worse than actuality. Direc-
tion of comparison has been widely used to parse the content of counterfactual thinking. Such
counterfactual thoughts about past outcomes may also connect to future-oriented individual
differences such as dispositional optimism, which is defined as domain-general beliefs that
future outcomes will be positive [4, 5].
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A subset of the counterfactual literature (comprising nine studies in six papers [6–11]; see
S1 Appendix) has examined the relationship between dispositional optimism and counterfac-
tual direction of comparison, finding that optimism predicts downward (vs. upward) counter-
factual thinking. That is, people who tend to hold positive expectancies about future outcomes
tend to think about how things in the past could have been worse (rather than better).
Although past studies indicate that optimism predicts downward counterfactual thinking [6–
11], we identify theoretical and methodological reasons to question those prior results.
Recent trends in scholarly research, particularly within the field of psychology, illuminate
the need to consider existing findings in light of new research practices and/or revised theoriz-
ing [12–15]. In particular, bias toward the publication of only “clean,” significant findings has
introduced a gap between reproducible effects and the refinement of existing (i.e., published)
knowledge. Proposed solutions to bridge this gap include (a) greater publication of incremen-
tal and, where appropriate, non-significant findings; (b) the use of increased power and greater
sample sizes; (c) preregistration; (d) single-paper meta-analyses; (e) reporting all, rather than
only significant, studies conducted; and, (f) data transparency—among many other recom-
mendations [15–20]. Following such recommendations, studies retesting published findings
and employing one or a combination of the proposed solutions are becoming commonplace
[c.f., 21–23]. The present paper draws on such recommendations to reexamine the relation
between optimism and counterfactual direction of comparison.
The goal of the present research is to conduct a new test of the relation between optimism
and counterfactual direction of comparison using a methodological approach superior to what
appears in the literature. We report the results of a large-sample, pre-registered main study,
followed by a single-paper meta-analysis that includes six preliminary studies (see S1 File).
Our meta-analytic summary of these data sets (7 total) provides a robust estimate of the effect
size relating optimism to counterfactual direction of comparison.
Theoretical background
Counterfactual thoughts play a key role in a range of emotions, judgments, and behaviors and
have been applied in studies from moral judgment [24] to mental health [25] and from the
neurocognitive underpinnings of choice [26] to the developmental progression of causal rea-
soning [27]. Counterfactuals are thoughts about the past, specifically how particular facets of
the past may have been different from actuality. Such thoughts may contain kernels of insight
that suggest new courses of action in the future. Indeed, the functional theory of counterfactual
thinking asserts that much of counterfactual thinking is oriented toward the formation of
intentions that embody learning and promote improvement [3, 28] and may therefore be use-
ful for goal pursuit [3, 28–31].
According to the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, individuals tend to generate
counterfactuals when there is a discrepancy between their actual state and desired end-state.
And more specifically, counterfactual direction of comparison characterizes the sorts of coun-
terfactuals that arise spontaneously in light of such a discrepancy. Upward counterfactuals,
because they specify improvement to the status quo, may be useful in articulating means by
which future performance might be improved. Indeed upward counterfactuals predominate in
response to recognition of an actual-ideal discrepancy. Conversely, downward counterfactuals
are related to affect regulatory goals. By way of a contrast effect, consideration of inferior out-
comes can make factual outcomes seem more positive. As a result, positive emotions such as
relief are evoked by downward counterfactual thoughts; such thoughts may thus be generated
strategically to repair mood. Although downward counterfactuals are generated less frequently
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overall than upward counterfactuals [32–35], they arise when individuals feel a need to com-
pensate for negative emotional states [36].
The link between goals and counterfactual direction of comparison is further illuminated by
consideration of the antecedents to counterfactual thinking. At the most basic level, outcome
valence is a key antecedent, such that negative more than positive outcomes activate upward
counterfactual thinking [37–39]. Additionally, situationally active performance goals differen-
tially influence counterfactual direction, such that when goals remain active (e.g., for tasks that
involve a repeating sequence) versus inactive (e.g., completed tasks), upward counterfactuals
are generated more frequently [40]. In addition, individual differences in chronic goals may
also be antecedents to counterfactual direction [41–43]. For example, incremental (vs. entity)
theorists, who see human behavior as more variable and hence improvable, are more likely to
generate upward (vs. downward) counterfactuals [43]. This same link is reflected in the “oppor-
tunity principle,” whereby the opportunity to change or amend prior outcomes is associated
with the generation of more upward (vs. downward) counterfactuals [3, 44]. In these varying
ways, goal cognition constitutes a key determinant of counterfactual direction of comparison.
A fundamental question, then, centers on how individuals form cognitions of the past and
future when it comes to counterfactual thinking, and whether there is meaningful variation
across individuals in this intersection. One way that prior theory has addressed this question is
via the relation between dispositional optimism and counterfactual direction of comparison
[6–11]. Optimists expect that good things will occur, resulting in confidence and persistence
in the face of challenges [45]. Moreover, optimism connects to models of behavioral self-regu-
lation, in that people engage in goal-congruent efforts to the extent that they expect their
efforts will eventually result in success [46, 47].
Dispositional optimism may therefore predict counterfactual direction. One way to define
optimism is at a domain-general (vs. domain-specific) level, as instantiated by the Life Orienta-
tion Test (LOT and LOT-R; [5, 47]). Defined in this way, optimism is associated with superior
coping outcomes [46, 48–51]. For example, coronary bypass patients who scored higher in
optimism recovered more quickly and reported higher quality of life six months post-surgery
[50]. Although optimism may engender positive coping outcomes partly via affect regulatory
processes (e.g., a self-serving attributional basis that mitigates the affective sting of negative
outcomes [52]), the bulk of recent evidence suggests that optimism brings beneficial outcomes
via performance improvement goals. For example, Scheier et al. [47] showed that optimism
more often involves performance improvement processes (e.g., active coping, planning, seek-
ing social support) than affect regulation (e.g., denying or disengaging). Nes and Segerstrom’s
[53] meta-analysis (N = 11,629) indicated that optimism is associated more strongly with per-
formance improvement goals (defined in terms of approach goals and active coping) than with
affect regulation (defined in terms of avoidance goals and passive coping). To be sure, perfor-
mance improvement is not the same as an approach goal, nor is affect regulation synonymous
with avoidance, yet nevertheless the degree of conceptual overlap indicates an overarching
connection between optimism and performance improvement. Upward counterfactuals con-
nect to performance improvement goals, whereas downward counterfactuals connect to affect
regulatory goals (e.g., [29, 32, 36, 40, 54, 55]). Thus, the optimism literature provides a basis
for predicting, through shared conceptual emphasis on performance improvement, that opti-
mism may predict upward (vs. downward) counterfactual thinking.
Extant findings
In contrast to the theoretically derived prediction described above, the counterfactual litera-
ture indicates that optimism predicts downward (vs. upward) counterfactual thinking [6–11].
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For example, Kasimatis and Wells [8] operationalized optimism with the LOT scale to predict
counterfactual thoughts collected in a thought-listing task. Those higher in optimism gener-
ated more downward than upward counterfactuals, but Kasimatis and Wells’ book chapter
report omitted many procedural and statistical details. Sanna [10] operationalized optimism
with the Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (DPQ; [52]) to predict students’ course-related
counterfactual thoughts collected via thought-listing—again, those higher in optimism gener-
ated more downward than upward counterfactuals. However, in this as well as a follow-up
study with similar findings [11], important statistical details were omitted, such as those cen-
tering on the main effect of optimism on counterfactual direction. Further, the use of tertile
splits and exclusion of the middle third of participants from analyses raises questions of statis-
tical precision in light of emerging data standards (e.g., [56]). Issues with dichotomizing the
optimism measure [7] as well as omitted statistical analyses [6, 9] further impact the conclu-
sions of the remaining papers to have shown that optimism predicts downward (vs. upward)
counterfactual thinking. A final point of concern is that to date, eight of Sanna’s papers have
been retracted because of data fraud [57]. Although the two relevant papers cited here have
not been retracted, a prudent reading of the literature suggests the need for a new look at the
relation between optimism and counterfactual direction of comparison.
Main study
To that end, our main study features four key improvements over the literature. First, we focus
on episodic counterfactuals that participants report regarding their own autobiographical
experiences [58]. The method of soliciting memories of episodic counterfactuals is superior to
two other methods to elicit counterfactual thinking: a) hypothetical scenarios (used in [8]), a
method vulnerable to the critique that participant responses are speculative than genuine, and
b) laboratory task (used in [10]), a method that, although yielding more genuine responses,
lacks cross-domain generality. Second, participants self-code the direction of each counterfac-
tual they generate using scale ratings, preventing independent coders (as in [8, 9, 10]) from
possible misinterpretation of ambiguous counterfactuals (e.g., “what if I had taken a ‘different’
train” could represent either a better or a worse alternative). Moreover, although much prior
research has dichotomized direction into upward versus downward, some prior research has
used scales (e.g., [59]), with the advantage of capturing greater variability in the way individu-
als report on counterfactual thoughts. Third, we assessed optimism using the LOT-R [47],
perhaps the best validated and most widely used of available optimism measures. Fourth, the
main study method solicited four episodic counterfactuals from each participant in an attempt
to enhance reliability of measurement via an entirely within-subject design.
The main study assessed the magnitude and direction of the association between optimism
and counterfactual direction of comparison. We report all conditions, measures, and any data
exclusions. The IRB of Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management approved
this study for Human Subject Research. Written informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants prior to their commencing the study and before any data collection. The study was
pre-registered on 10-9-2018, and all materials and de-identified data are available at: https://
osf.io/wudjs/.
We hypothesized that optimism would not predict greater downward (vs. upward) counter-
factual thinking. Further, based on evidence from the counterfactual and optimism literatures
connecting both upward counterfactuals and more optimistic individuals to improved perfor-
mance on goals, we theorized the opposite pattern may emerge—that is, that optimism may
predict greater upward (vs. downward) counterfactual thinking. Thus, our aim was to
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reexamine the link between optimism and counterfactual direction of comparison that has
received prior research attention.
Method
Sample size and power. An a priori power analysis was conducted using G�Power
v3.1.9.4 to determine the minimum sample size required to find significance based on an effect
size of = .08, alpha = .05, power = .8, two-tail t-test, using a within-subject design. This analysis
resulted in a desired sample of 1,229 participants. Although this power calculation was based
on a t-test, our analysis relies primarily on a mixed effects model (MEM). Given continued
debate on how best to calculate power for MEMs, and given such models should be more sen-
sitive than t-tests, we believe that this power calculation is a reasonable way to determine sam-
ple size in our study. Specifically, sample size requirements for the analyses for the predictors
in our model (optimism, context, and opportunity) would fall within this minimum sample
size of 1,229 [60–62]. From our prior experience with attrition rates, we assumed a completion
rate of .6 from Time 1 (T1) to Time 2 (T2) and on this basis we set the desired sample size for
T1 at N = 2,050.
The final sample (comprising participants who completed both T1 and T2) consisted of
1,150 adults drawn from MTurk (59% female; Mage = 36, SDage = 12). The T1 sample consisted
of 2,059 adults; out of this number 1,287 (63%) returned at T2. Participants not following
instructions (e.g., answered “na” or gibberish, n = 119) or failing attention checks (n = 18), as
determined by the first author, were excluded from analyses (total exclusions, n = 137). T1
data collection took place between 10-4-2018 and 10-5-2018; T2 data collection took place
between 10-11-2018 and 10-14-2018.
Research design and measures. The T1 assessment focused on optimism, measured
using the 6-item LOT-R with 5-point response options, averaged to create the optimism index
(α = .88). Participants responded to demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, race, and ethnic-
ity) and an open-ended attention check (“Please confirm you are human by describing the
weather outside right now where you are”).
The T2 assessment centered on counterfactual thinking. To introduce variability in the ten-
dency to report upward and downward counterfactuals, participants reported counterfactual
alternatives to four autobiographical events with prompts that varied according to a 2 (context:
personal vs. professional) × 2 (opportunity: low vs. high) factorial design (fully within-subject).
Participants read the instructions: “This survey asks you about four separate events from your
recent past. Your job is to answer brief questions about what you remember.” Participants
then responded to four prompts: 1) low opportunity professional, 2) low opportunity personal,
3) high opportunity professional, and 4) high opportunity personal (with order of presentation
randomized). For each, participants recalled and shared details about a recent negative experi-
ence (see Table 1). The choice of personal versus professional context was based on the




Think back to a recent NEGATIVE experience
you had at WORK or SCHOOL that there are
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO.
Think back to a recent NEGATIVE experience
you had with FRIENDS or FAMILY that there
are POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO.
Low
Opportunity
Think back to a recent NEGATIVE experience
you had at WORK or SCHOOL that there is
NO WAY TO RESOLVE.
Think back to a recent NEGATIVE experience
you had with FRIENDS or FAMILY that there is
NO WAY TO RESOLVE.
Exact prompts used in Main Study assigning participants to the 2 (context: personal vs. professional) × 2
(opportunity: low vs. high) factorial design (within-subject) conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237644.t001
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observation that life regrets, which derive from counterfactual thinking, tend to focus on these
contexts more frequently than others [44, 63]. The opportunity manipulation derived from
past demonstrations that upward counterfactuals are more common under conditions of high
(vs. low) opportunity [3]. The manipulation of opportunity thus afforded an internal, theoreti-
cally-based check on our measurement technique. Replication of this known effect lends credi-
bility to our methods.
Next, we solicited counterfactual thoughts with a prompt that intended to be neutral with
regard to upward or downward direction of comparison: “After having experiences like this,
sometimes people have thoughts like ‘what if’—in that they think about how things could have
gone differently. In the space below, please share one ‘what if’ thought.”
Our dependent measure, counterfactual direction of comparison, was assessed using a self-
report rating scale. Specifically, after each counterfactual prompt, participants responded to:
(1) “Does your ‘what if’ thought focus more on how things could have gone better or how
things could have gone worse?”; (2) “In general when you look back at this experience, do you
tend to ponder more about how things could have gone better or how things could have gone
worse?”; and, (3) “When you look back at this experience, does it make more sense to you to
reflect on how the outcome could have been better or how the outcome could have been
worse?” on 5-point scales anchored at [-2] = Definitely Worse to [2] = Definitely Better. We
averaged these three items to create an index of counterfactual direction for each of the four
prompts (α1 = .87; α2 = .88; α3 = .90; α4 = .90; overall α = .85). Participants responded to the
same demographic measures and attention check as in T1.
Results
Analyses were conducted using JMP Pro v14.1.0. In the counterfactual direction index, posi-
tive values indicate an upward direction of comparison and negative values indicate a down-
ward direction of comparison. Overall, the mean counterfactual direction score was greater
than zero, M = 0.98, SD = 0.75; t(1149) = 44.33, p< .001, 95% CI [0.96, 1.00], revealing a gen-
eral tendency toward generating more upward than downward counterfactuals, an effect con-
sistent with the prior literature (e.g., [32–35]).
We ran a mixed regression model with mean-centered optimism (M = 2.28, SD = 0.88),
context (professional = 0; personal = 1), opportunity (low = 0; high = 1), and all 2 and
3-way interactions between these factors, as predictors of counterfactual direction, with
participant-level variation accounted for as a random effect. This overall model was significant,
AICc = 13495.93, p< .001. Critically, this regression showed a significant effect of optimism,
b = .06, SE = .03, β = .05, t(1152.5) = 2.29, p = .022, 95% CI [.008, .11], such that greater opti-
mism predicted more upward counterfactuals (see Fig 1). The main effect of context was not
significant, b = -.01, SE = .01, β = -.02, t(3447.9) = -1.08, p = .26, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.01]. However,
we did observe a significant main effect of opportunity, b = .07, SE = .01, β = .07, t(3447.9) =
5.32, p< .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.10], such that events high (vs. low) in opportunity predicted
more upward counterfactuals. Because this opportunity effect replicates prior research [3], we
gain confidence in the fidelity of the method. There were no significant 2-way or 3-way inter-
actions (ps > .23).
In support of our hypothesis, the main study reveals that optimism does not predict greater
downward counterfactual thinking, as prior research had found. Instead, this study shows that
optimism weakly predicts greater upward than downward counterfactual thinking and that
this effect is consistent across two different contexts of life, personal and professional.
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Statistical summary of studies
We ran six preliminary studies between February 2017 and March 2018. We summary these
prior studies here to avoid a potential bias by not reporting prior unpublished studies and to
illuminate the rationale for the main study’s sample size. We report all methodological details
of the preliminary studies in the S1 File. Further, Table 2 summarizes key methodological
details (measures and manipulations) as well as the results, focusing on the effect (β) of opti-
mism on counterfactual direction of comparison.
Table 3 summarizes the focal relation between optimism and counterfactual direction of
comparison as estimated across all studies conducted. We conducted a meta-analysis as per
McShane and Bockenholt [19] by way of 1) averaging across all conditions within a study, 2)
computing the correlation between the two key variables across each study, 3) converting that
correlation to the Fisher Z scale, and 4) analyzing via the basic random effects meta-analytic
model (see S1 File for R-code). From this analysis (N = 3,051), we noted a mean effect size of
r = 0.06, SE = .02, Z = 3.38, p = .0007, 95% CI [.03, .10]. Importantly, although this effect is
weak, it supports our initial hypothesis that optimism does not predict greater downward
counterfactual thinking. Instead, this meta-analysis suggests optimism is more clearly, albeit
weakly, linked to greater upward counterfactual direction of comparison.
Fig 1. Dispositional optimism predicts counterfactual direction of comparison, moderated by context and
opportunity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237644.g001
Table 2. Summary of methodologies and results across all studies.
Study N Optimism Measure(s) (IV) Counterfactual Direction Measure (DV) Moderators (Manipulated) Effect (β)
P1 197 LOT-R Three-item scale Outcome Valence β = 0.07, p = .46
P2 494 Same as P1 Dichotomous Same as P1 β = 0.15, p = .29
P3 199 Same as P1 Same as P1 β = 0.02, p = .80
P4 290 Same as P1 Same as P1 Same as P1 β = 0.10, p = .09
P5 196 Same as P1 and DPQ Same as P1 Same as P1 LOT-R: β = 0.07, p = .43 DPQ: β = -0.07, p = .47
P6 525 Same as P1 and DPQ Same as P1 Same as P1 LOT-R: β = 0.06, p = .15 DPQ: β = 0.06, p = .17
Main 1150 Same as P1 Same as P1 Context, Opportunity β = 0.05, p = .02
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237644.t002
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Conclusions
Is an optimist more likely to see counterfactual alternatives that specify a better (upward) or
worse (downward) state of affairs, relative to actuality? This question hinges on their underly-
ing goals, which might either center on performance improvement or affect regulation. If per-
formance improvement goals dominate, the optimist will generate counterfactuals that help
them to improve in the future (upward counterfactuals). But if affect regulatory goals domi-
nate, the optimist will generate counterfactuals that help them to feel better in the moment
(downward counterfactuals). The prior counterfactual literature indicates the latter answer,
that optimism predicts downward counterfactual thinking. However, the theoretical consensus
in the optimism literature suggests a different pattern, that optimism predicts upward counter-
factual thinking. Given uncertainty surrounding the counterfactual literature (methodological,
statistical, data reporting), we conducted new research to examine this relation, and provide
evidence that optimism weakly predicts upward counterfactual thinking. Thus, our current
result is consistent with the optimism literature (generally speaking) but not the counterfactual
literature (as it pertains to optimism). Future research might explore potential moderators
leading to our result compared to prior findings, potentially exploring the methodological dif-
ferences as a factor. Furthermore, although we found a weak relation between optimism and
upward counterfactual direction of comparison, future research may explore the role of per-
formance improvement goals as linking these constructs.
Our key result does connect to a broader theme in the counterfactual literature, namely
that “counterfactual thoughts often reflect goals and the varying means to reach those goals
. . . Imagining alternative pathways by which past goals might have been achieved provides
insights that comprise blueprints for future action” ([3], pp. 5). Our results thus speak to the
intersection of past-focused versus future-focused thinking. As individuals look to the past
to imagine alternatives to factual events, they likely rely upon the same brain system (e.g.,
[26]) as when they look to the future to imagine those possibilities that may yet come to pass.
Optimism, as an enduring individual difference, plays a role in thoughts of both the past and
future.
Supporting information
S1 Appendix. Summary table of prior research. A summary table of nine studies across six
papers published between 1995 and 2015, which indicate that optimism predicts downward
(vs. upward) counterfactual thinking. This summary table reports the authors and year of
Table 3. Statistical summary of studies.
Study N r P
Preliminary 1 197 0.10 0.17
Preliminary 2 494 0.04 0.35
Preliminary 3 199 -0.03 0.64
Preliminary 4 290 0.06 0.28
Preliminary 5 196 0.13 0.08
Preliminary 6 525 0.06 0.15
Main Study 1150 0.07 0.02
Meta-analysis 3,051 0.06 .0007
Overall mean effect of optimism on counterfactual direction, as estimated across the six preliminary and one main
studies.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237644.t003
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publication; the study number within the publication (if applicable); the total sample size of
the study (if reported); the design of that study including the conditions participants were
assigned to or whether the design was correlational; how counterfactuals were elicited (i.e., in
response to what prompts or events); the scale that was used to capture trait optimism; what
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